Homo Eruditio

International Environmental Politics 수업에서 황사에 대한 페이퍼를 쓴다.. 그러니까 정확히 말하면 황사에 대해 한중일 3국 정부가, 또는 그 이외의 기관들 (NGO라든가 전문가들이라든가)이 어떻게 활동하고 있는지.

자료가 무진장 많진 않지만 그렇다고 페이퍼를 못 쓸만큼 적은 것도 아니다. 

얼마전 IO 수업에서 토론에서 써먹었던 Keohane & Victor의 Regime Complex 중 하나일수도 있겠고, (알고보니 이 페이퍼 IEP에서 한번 리딩으로 주어졌었네?? 왜 나는 몰랐니..... 진짜 이 과목을 공부 안하긴 했구나 OTL)

Compose an essay of at least 3000 words that addresses the question below:

So far this semester we have read materials that support the assertion that states find it easier to cooperate in some environmental issues than in others. Moreover, once states do create international environmental regimes, these institutions are frequently ineffective. Discuss the twin issues of cooperation and effectiveness in international regimes. How do the concepts of context, interest, knowledge, and power explain the process of cooperation, in general and at least two specific environmental regimes in particular?

Context / Interest / Knowledge / Power

이 네 가지에서 설명을 해야하는 거다. 일단 맥락은 현황을 설명한다고 치고..

Interest라면, 중국은 일단 자국 경제 발전이 급급해서 여태껏 환경 피해에 대해 신경쓸 여유가 없는 거다. 거기다가 황사의 발원지인 네이멍구는 나름 '자치구'라는 이름을 붙여 뒀으니, 책임 소재를 피하려면 언제든 피할 수 있는 거 아닌가 하는게 내 가정. 

Knowledge 파트는 이걸 정말 지식의 측면에서 설명해야 하는건진 모르겠는데 ㅇ_ㅇ

Power는 중국이랑 일본의 힘 싸움에 한국이 중간에 짜부러드는... 슬픈 현실.... 과연 이걸 환경이슈랑 어떻게 연결지을까??? 최대 피해국임에도 불구하고 본격적인 소송을 건다거나 하지는 못하는...?? 

결론 부분에서 미래의 가능성을 논하자면..

interest의 변화가 가장 크게 와닿을 거 같다. 중국의 내부에서도 환경 이슈에 대한 여론이 영 안좋은 탓에, 중국이 어쨌거나 이젠 뭔가를 좀 해야겠다는 식으로 나오기도 한다. 물론 미세먼지랑 스모그가 중국 내부에선 가장 가장 문제가 되고 있지만, 황사 또한 중국에서 문제를 일으켜왔으므로 분명 이것도 같이 해결하는 제스쳐를 취하지 않을까?! 라는 희망적인 아이디어..

경제성장 둔화 때문에 날이 서있는 중국이 과연 여기까지 신경쓸 수 있을까 싶긴 한데, 그래도 난 좀 긍정적인 아이디어를 보고시펑 T_T

국제환경정치 수업 텀 페이퍼를 써야하는데, 처음에 북한-이란 non-proliferation 비교를 하려다가 스케일이 너무 커져버리는 거 같아서 한참 고민 끝에 그냥 중국 때문에 황사 및 미세먼지로 고생하는 한국의 이야기를 쓰기로 했다. 나름 국가 간의 문제고 교수님이 관심을 보여주셔서 ㅎㅎㅎㅎ 아무튼 다른 나라 논하는 건 칠레 페이퍼로 충분하다 ㅠ_ㅠ 내가 제일 잘 할 수 있는거 할래요...

그래서 논문을 몇 개 찾았고, 어떤 협력 정책이 있는지를 찾아보고 있는데, 아무래도 그 배경 설명, 한중일 협조는 어떤 방식으로 이루어졌는지, 그리고 이게 효과가 있었는지... 과학적 지식이 좀 부족하긴 하지만 로켓사이언스를 요구하는 건 아니잖아요??

비슷한 사례로 유럽 사례가 있었던 것 같은데 이거랑 조금 parallel한 시각에서 바라보는 것도 도움이 되지 않을까, 뭐 그런 생각이 잠시 들었다. (페이퍼 다시 읽어봐야지 이건 ~_~)

 91년 겨울 IO에 실린, A. Moravcsik의 Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community

70~80년대에 요원해보이던 유럽 공동체 논의가 어쩌다 급물살을 타게 되었느냐는 문제에서 결국 가장 주요한 건 작은 행위자들보다 3국(영,프,독)의 국내적 정치 상황이라는 심플한 얘기. 기존 논의에서 elite alliance라든가 business interest group 정도를 독립변수로 잡았다면, 이 논문은 3국의 bargaining에 조금 더 초점을 둔다. 

- First stylized explanation: the independent activism of international or transnational actors

- Second stylized explanation: bargaining between leaders of the most powerful states of Europe (영,프,독)

I. Explanations:

 1. Supranational institutionalism: European institutions, Transnational business interest groups, International political leaders

 2. Supranational institutionalism and neofuctionalism

 3. Intergovernmental institutionalism: Intergovernmentalism, Lowest-common-denominator bargaining, Protection of sovereignty

 4. Intergovernmental institutionalism and modified structural realism

II. National interests and 1992

 1. Germany: consistent support

 2. France: the road to Damascus

 3. Britain: the road to Milan

III. Setting an agenda for Europe: a policy history of the 1992 initiative

 1. The turning point: the French presidency

 2. The breakthrough: the Fontainebleau summit meeting

 3. Victory for the minimalists: the intergovernmental conference

IV. Interpreting the negotiations

 1. Assessing supranational institutionalism

  i) European institutions

  ii) Transnational business interest groups

  iii) International political leaders

 2. Supranational institutionalism and neofunctionalism

 3. Assessing intergovernmental institutionalism

  i) Intergovernmentalism

  ii) Lowest-common-denominator bargaining

  iii) Protection of sovereignty

 4. International institutionalism and domestic politics

  i) Statism: the autonomy of political leaders

  ii) Bureaucratic politics: the role of technocracy

  iii) Partisan support: the role of centrist coalitions

  iv) Economic functionalism: the role of policy failure

Conclusion

http://www.icbl.org/ (International Campaign to Ban Landmines)

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Peace Time

저자

Fortna, Virginia Page 지음

출판사

Princeton University Press | 2001-01-01 출간

카테고리

예술/건축

책소개

Why do cease-fire agreements someti...

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(대체 카테고리가 왜 예술/건축이지... -_-?)

풀 타이틀은 <Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace>

병원에서의 무료함을 메꾸기 위해 교수님한테 책 리스트를 받아왔는데 그 중 한 권. 아마존 배송 예정일보다 빨리 도착해서 모셔올 수 있었다. IR 공부하는 사람들이라면 다 읽는 책이라고 하지만, 공부하는 사람들의 평균 지성에 나는 언제쯤 미칠수 있을까 좌절하며 읽기 시작했는데.. 그래도 국제정치 수업 두 학기 들었다고 아예 모르는 얘기는 아니라서 느릿느릿 진도를 빼고 있다.

제일 안 넘어가는 Ch.1 목차만 보면..

A Theory of Agreements and the Durability of Peace

I. Cooperation Theory and Peace Agreements

 1. Obstacles to Peace

  (1) Incentives to Attack

  (2) Fear of Attack

  (3) Accidents and Involuntary Defection

  (4) Distribution and Relative Gains

 2. Strategies for Improving the Prospects for Peace

  (1) Raising the Cost of Attack

  (2) Reducing Uncertainty about Actions and Intentions

  (3) Preventing and Controlling Accidents

 3. Peace Mechanisms

  (1) Phyisical Constraints

   Hypothesis 1: Withdrawal of forces from the cease-fire line yields more durable peace.

   Hyp 2: Peace lasts longer when demilitarized zones are set up.

   Hyp 3: Arms control measures increase the durability of peace.

   Hyp 4: Measures to prevent involuntary defection make peace more stable.

  (2) The Role of Outsiders: Peacekeeping and Third-Party Guarantees

   Hyp 1: Peace is more likely to last if international peace keepers are present.

   Hyp 2: Third-party guarantees make peace more durable.

  (3) Communication and Signaling

   Hyp 1: Peace is more durable when confidence-building measures are implemented.

   Hyp 2: Dispute resolution procedures make peace last longer.

   Hyp 3: More specific cease-fire agreements are morel likely to hold.

   Hyp 4: Formal agreements lead to more durable peace than tacit agreements.

   Hyp 5: All else equal, the stronger the agreement implemented, the longer peace lasts.

  (4) Political Settlement

   Hyp: Peace agreements that settle political issues lead to more durable peace than military armistice or cease-fire

          agreement

II. Agreements and the Baseline Prospects for Peace: A Counterargument and Rebuttal

 Hyp 1: Strong agreements are concluded when the baseline prospects for peace are relatively good.

 Hyp 2: Strong agreements are concluded when the baseline prospects for peace are relatively dim.

III. The Baseline Prospects for Peace: Situational Variables

Summary of the Argument

이상인데, 대충 무슨 얘기가 나올까 짐작은 가는데 워낙 잘 쓰여진 책이라고 하니 논리 전개 방식을 들여다보는 게 목표. 앞으로는 사례적용하면서 하나씩 살펴보겠지? 으음.. 퇴원 전까지 다 읽긴 읽을 수 있을까...

Summary of “International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War“ by David C. Kang

Why scholars have been wrong in predicting the fate of the Korean Peninsula since 1950s? The author’s answer to stable situation between two Koreas is simple: Deterrence worked. Whenever South Korea went through some emergent situations, such as two times of military coup, withdrawal of U.S. troops, democratic movements in 1986-87, and the nuclear crisis of 1992-94, most of the scholars became worried about North’s invasion. This writing “fiercely” criticizes existing hypothesis which presume North Korean leadership to be insane or paranoiac. Moreover, un-elaborated relation between the variables caused an ambiguity in the real cause and effect. Also, it argues that not only North Korea but also United States is responsible to the crisis of 2002 with U.S. hawkish attitude.

Social scientists who predict the second Korean War have been applied power transition and preventive war theory to the peninsula, which caused pessimistic view. However, the theory is irrelevant to the Korean case. Preventive War and Power Transition Theory is based upon two variables: Relative power and satisfaction with the status quo. Additionally, there are general assumptions such as rationality of nation-states, nation-states as the unit of analysis, and anarchic international system.

When general preventive situation happens, there are two types of country, called “defender,” a stronger power, and “challenger,” which is not satisfied with its current position. Organski and Kugler, by empirical testing, defined “power as equal when the challenger was at least 80 percent of the defender in size as measured by GNP,” and tested “whether preventive wars occurred as challengers approached or passed 80-percent value.” To apply their hypothesis to the Korean Peninsula, the North should be the “challenger” at least, which never happened. In addition, measuring satisfaction with the status quo that the North feels has not done sufficiently in the field.

In terms of relative power, North Korea never had the material capacity to be a match for U.S.-ROK alliance. Total GNP of South Korea have always lead the situation and, it does not change in a per capita numbers. Including the U.S. in the calculation or not, there is no doubt to say the North has never been preeminent over the South in economic size.

Also in military sector, the North’s actual capability has fallen behind the South’s. Many experts say that South Korean military’s effectiveness is stronger and than North’s numerical superiority, even without the deployed U.S. troops. Having crisis in its economy, North Korea has reduced their training to the minimum level, which deteriorates combat readiness. Defense spending’s gap is the frank indicator, too.

Ignoring the role of U.S. is also one of the reasons for miscalculating the balance of power. Comparing just two Koreas is not appropriate unless North Korea thinks that U.S. military stationed in South will cravenly escape when it get invaded. Moreover, there are also numerous U.S. troops in Japan who are always ready to support when neighbors are involved in furious conflict. In 1960s, there might have been a turning point to the North if they had challenged the balance of power. Rather, Kim Il-Sung only pursued restricted campaign to the South, which is a sign that deterrence works well.

If North Korea had been in preeminent position comparing to the South, the possibility of full-scale war can be discussed as the late 1960s aggressive attitude of the North was in accordance with the North’s peak of capability. In these days, the South’s overwhelming size of economy indicated by various indexes is irrefutable and this is why the article can strongly argue there will be no reckless provocation by the North.

Literatures about North Korea’s aggressiveness tend to presuppose the worst case because no scholar in the field fully understands the state. Unlike evaluating other countries, it is easy to doubt North Korean leadership as a insane or impulsive organization. However, by mistrusting the rationality of Kim regime, it becomes impossible to discuss in realistic view which is built upon the belief in states’ sanity.

Also, two Kims have shown able leadership over palace, domestic realm and international society. Although Kim Jong-Il was not expected to achieve domestic stability after his father Kim Il-Sung’s dead, famine, flood, or financial crisis could not stop him having a firm authority. Elder Kim ruled the country for half a century through the enormous changes in the world around it and there must have been a skillful management. Therefore, it is not so wise to treat those Kims as just irrational and paranoiac leaders merely due to distorted images.

Had been another kind of regime which is not autocratic, could the conflict between two Koreas or between North Korea and the U.S. have been different? Considering the Cold War and american attitude toward communist states, things would have not been changed a lot. Focusing on the Kims only is inappropriate again in this manner.

Kang points out that there are three reasons why he can firmly say North’s diplomatic attitude has been misunderstood: No general mobilization since the truce, selectively used evidence by scholars, and discouraged aggression by South’s stabilization and prosperity. North has acted more cautiously than we thought but scholars such as Richard Betts exaggerated occasional terrorist activities which ended in 1987 and perverted the genuine intention of the North.

Desperation theory is about “cornered tiger,” who have no choice but attack its adversary before it collapses thoroughly, and some theorists say that North Korea may invade South as a last resort due to ceaseless hardships in North. The problem is, this argument is not based on concrete data, as all the others are not. In this case, North Korean leadership’s psychological or perceptual basis matters.

Observing U.S’s military operation in Iraq and Kosovo and knowing exactly what that have now, North Korea is fully-aware that attack on South or on U.S. is a complete suicidal action. It also indicates that North is not much desperate as people normally view. If it does not have things to lose by opening fire and it is the only option left, it could already do during last fifty years but they, as everybody knows, did not. North Korea knows its weak point and it still has hope for survival. That is why North has not provoked any kind of full-scale attack to South.

Despite the nuclear revelations of the 2002, North Korea has tried to rebuild the relations in international society. Opening to the west is needed to rehabilitate North’s society and nuclear and missile program is one of the means to acquire security guarantees, which is linked to the opening policy. Its efforts to attract foreign investment have been so serious that the substantial amount of legal frames were modified. For example, Rajin-Sonbong area had been the only available region to pure foreign capital but the relevant laws were amended and regional restriction was lifted to some degree. Also, North Korea has been attempting to be a member of international institutions such as Asian Development Bank and IMF. Additionally, including Australia, Italy and Canada, North has been courting middle powers. Especially with the South Korean corporations, enormous contractions, such as Haeju railway project and building factories, have been progressed amazingly. In conclusion, putting all the actions done by North Korea together, the North has been tried as much as they can since it assesses that itself has potentiality to be improved.

There has been always a tension in the peninsula but it did not develop into an all-out war. The balance of power held by numerical superiority of North and systemic superiority of U.S.-ROK ally has worked successfully. Undivided ethnicity between two Koreas and geographic proximity also make the situation not so simple. The fact that North Korea started the Korean War and that North committed some terrorist attacks made scholars assume that North Korea is aggressive under any circumstance. But that is not the important point in this discussion because full-scale war and sporadic terrorism are totally different in their own intention and object.

North Korea’s allegation to fire nuclear warhead at the U.S. is doubted that it is just a bluff for three reasons. First of all, the North has not developed the capability this much yet. Secondly, massive American retaliation that can destroy the whole country is easily expected when North Korea attacks U.S. Lastly, ballistic missile is very ineffective and expensive way to use nuclear weapons―except its detering ability. Capability does not mean intention itself. Since its first goal is to survive, its goal is not to increase tension.

Making mistakes in application of assumptions and causal logic, preventive war, preemptive war, the madman hypothesis and the desperation hypothesis have constantly failed to predict the Korean peninsula’s fate. Lack of elaboration in variables made the preventive war and power transition theories imagine the worst case, the Second Korean War, which has not happened for last fifty years.

Then, what caused the North Korea to reopen the threatening strategy with nuclear weapons? The author points out U.S. hawkish attitude of Republican administration toward North Korea hurted the possibility of mutual trust. North Korea is commonly blamed for a failure of the 1994 Agreed Framework but according to Kang, U.S. also can not be free from the criticism. For instance, even during the Clinton administration, the lightwater replacement schedule was far behind schedule for three years because U.S. hesitated. Moreover, Bush administration called North Korea an “axis of evil” in public speech and showed deep-rooted mistrust to the North.

Giving consideration to recent North Korea’s behavior, this state surely has the will to accept the change in their economic reform and ultimately, social reform. Pressuring the little rascal who has been already determined to be a good kid can not be a wise discipline since an adverse effect is expected. A policy of isolation, economic sanctions or economic engagement will be also ineffective because those are not about the root cause of North Korea’s actions.

Summary of "Offense, Defense and the Causes of War”  by Stephen Van Evera

Does the offense dominance really threaten world peace? The condition of offensive advantage itself or the situation where states find themselves who have offensive advantage (whether it is true or not) makes world more dangerous and insecure place, according to this article.

  Stephen Van Evera, who proposed and developed ‘Offense-Defense theory,’ argues that there are ten effects of offense dominance and those are decisive elements of bringing about war: Opportunistic expansionism, defensive expansionism, fierce resistance to other’s expansion, attraction of moving first, increased necessity of preventive war due to widened windows of opportunity and vulnerability, faits accomplis as a diplomatic strategy, lessened negotiation and agreements, tighter secrecy between countries, overheated arms race, and vicious cycle of offense dominance.

  Under the circumstance of offensive advantage, states are apt to expand because ‘booty’ of victory is so tempting that even gentle states seriously consider changing their behavior. This causes opportunistic expansionism. On the other hand, states are vulnerable to others’ assault when offense is strong. States want to fortify themselves by conquering other states’ strategic area or obtaining mines of important raw materials such as iron. (It sounds paradoxical that defensive motivation eventually triggers offensive behavior.) This is why defensive expansionism emerges, and those expansionism leads to the resistance of other states eventually. If neighbor state inclines to expansionism, no state would obediently accept its neighbor’s aggressive behavior. As a result, risky interaction between neighbors gets self-strengthened and tends to proliferate hostility, whether intended or not. Also, the incentive to preemptive strike is a natural consequence of offense dominance when considering self-help is a main principle under international anarchy.

  When a power shift happens between states, traditional superpower feels nervous though the ranking itself has not affected yet, because the ‘window of vulnerability’ can be opened widely and this may cause newly rising power to gain more capability and to occupy the uppermost point finally. For that reason, ‘window of opportunity’ should be opened when offense has advantage, or weakened defense would be Achilles’ heel.

  Faits Accomplis (accomplished fact) tactic is appealing when offense dominates because it promises valuable rewards. Especially, Faits Accomplis are more hazardous under offensive advantage. If they become successful, relative capability might easily shift and it causes opponent states’ anxiety.

  Under the offensive advantageous circumstance, states tend to be uncooperative to each other because bargaining range is not much wide since they prefer to declare a war rather than to suffer loss. Also, states are apt to devote themselves to arms race which is related to windows of vulnerability and opportunity and false optimism. There are seven incentives to reinforce military power under the offensive advantage: (1)Cumulative nature of resource (2)Difficulty of self-defense (3)Alert attitude of nations (4)Possibility of quick victory (5)Effectiveness of offense (6)Misunderstanding from tightened secrecy (7)Fewer arms control.

  Lastly, offense dominance is enhanced by itself for three reason. First, states prefer to purchase offensive armaments since they are eager to maximize what they have now. Second, alliances present offensive inclination, and it is based on temerarious belief on allies’ participation. Third, status-quo state is not effective to keep safe its allies from invasion because an invader state can prevail defenders before military aid reaches.

  Then what decides offense-defense dominance in real world? The article suggests four kinds of factors: military, geographic, domestic social and political, and diplomatic factors. (Author asserts it is a far widened concept in comparison to existing ideas since they had focused on military technology only.)

  Military offense-defense dominance is determined by three elements: military technology, doctrine and force postured and deployments. In terms of technology, fortification was the most important and effective way to gain military capability in the Middle Age. Also, there was cavalry-favoring technology in that period. This caused dominance of defense. But after iron became cheaper and mass production emerged, offense got power since fortification skills were beaten by mass armies. Moreover, French mass armies were strengthened with mobility. After Napoleon’s downfall, european states armed with conservative idea abandoned since those governments were not enough popular to make their troops purely loyal. But democracy’s emergence and development enabled re-appearance of mass armies in mid-nineteenth century. The combined effects of lethal small arms, barbed wire, entrenchments, and railroads favored the defense dominance during the World War I, but offense soon overrode those defensive materials due to motorized armor and offensive doctrine. Since the thermonuclear weapons’ invention, world has dominated by power of defense. Additionally, history shows that technology and doctrine usually correlate with each other. Sometimes one shapes the other and sometimes it happens conversely. As another element, military posture and force deployments matter. Soviet and Germany’s case during 1939-41, U.S. and Japan’s case in 1941, and Egypt and Israel’s case before 1967 war are supporting the factors.

  States having natural barriers (e.g. ocean, lake, wide river, grand mountain, dense jungle, or vast desert), especially with borders, do not much worry about being attacked or conquered. United Kingdom, France, Italy and United States are relatively secure states thanks to geographical advantage. On the other hand, Eastern Europe, Middle East including Israel, and Germany (because of its eastern frontier) are traditionally vulnerable to neighbors’ attack due to geographical simplicity.

  Domestic social and political factors show different aspect and the change is connected with technological advance in early nineteenth century. Traditionally, popular regime has advantage in mobilizing army and guerilla for defending invaders. On the contrary, when domestic politics is unstable and government lacks popularity, discontent citizens can cooperate with intruders from foreign states instead of helping existing leadership. Therefore, popular regime was more likely to become advantageous in offensive strategy than unpopular one. However, technology made difference 1800s and cheaper and massively producted weapons favored Guerilla. This caused popular regimes to pursue defensive strategy to march in step with the change.

  Diplomatic factors have three kinds of tactic: collective security systems, defensive alliances, and balancing behavior by neutral states. These are effective tools to hamper states’ aggressive movement. Collective security systems and defensive alliances are very similar in its purpose and function. They differ in where their enemy exists – potentially in the group or outside the alliance. Neutral states’ balancing behavior has good instances of Britain and United States. Those states did not always conduct activism, but when they acted as “responsible hegemons,” at least, offense-defense balance got stabilized.

  Before designing actual tests, author establishes prime predictions and explanatory predictions. According to author’s another literature, “prime predictions are inferred from its prime hypothesis,” and prime hypothesis “frames a theory’s claim that its independent phenomenon causes its dependent phenomenon.” Explanatory predictions are also inferred from its explanatory hypothesis and “explanatory hypothesis explain how the theory’s independent phenomenon causes its dependent phenomenon.” Testing both predictions “tells us if explanatory hypotheses operate and thereby shed light on both whether and how the hypothesis operates.”

  For the prime predictions, three arguments are suggested: (1)War will be more common in periods when conquest is easy or is believed easy, and vice versa. (2)States that have or believe they have large offensive opportunities or defensive vulnerabilities will start and fight more wars than others. (3)A state will initiate and fight more wars in periods when it has, or thinks that it has, larger offensive opportunities and defensive capabilities. For the explanatory predictions, two predictions are inferred: (1)Ten phenomena above will be more common in eras of real or perceived offense dominance (2)States that have or believe they large offensive opportunities or defensive vulnerabilities will more potently carry out polices which involve those ten phenomena.

  The article demonstrates its hypothesis with three historical cases and those descriptions contain the passage of time in limited terrain. Accordingly, independent variables should be the factors which have variations with the change of era, unlike geographic factors. First test is about Europe from 1789 to 1990s.

  European case is the most supportive example of offense-defense theory since it shows dynamic shift from defense to offense or vice versa and theory’s expectation almost exactly matches. It is classified into seven periods, and military factors and diplomatic factors were influential in dominance change.

Summary of “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy” by Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane

Even without an central governmental or police power, states often cooperate with each other, sometimes to get what they want and sometimes to get away from what they do not want to face. Cooperative condition is certainly different from harmonized one, so it naturally contains adjustment and bargaining. Under anarchical international system, even though it is hard to achieve strongly bonded cooperation, states and other actors such as international economy subjects shed light to possibility of constructing decent collaboration and of avoiding a collision.

  First section of the article deals with the effects of structure on cooperation. According to authors, payoff structure, the shadow of the future, and the number of actors affect the disposition of actors to work together. It is not just applicable to cooperation between states, but also to general actors who have capability and necessity to cooperate.

  Payoff structure for a game determines the cooperative degree. There are four types of game depending on perceptions of actors, which are called Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Chicken, and Deadlock. Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game that each player has a strong incentive to defect, because a player always takes advantage in betraying whatever counterpart chooses. (DC>CC, DD>CD) Stag Hunt is different from Prisoner’s Dilemma since the player has to consider the choice that the other would make. (CC>DC, DD>CD) In case of Deadlock, players believe mutual defection is better than mutual cooperation, (DD>CC) so bilateral betrayal always happens. (Chicken game is not mentioned explicitly in the article, but DC>CC>CD>DD is known for its preference order.) Oye provided an example of shift from Prisoner’s Dilemma to Deadlock on monetary diplomacy in the 1930s, the age when states prefer to act independently. Arms races are considered as a games of Deadlock, and offensive superpowers in early 20th century exceedingly sacrificed themselves for a proper instance.

  As the second dimensional factor, the Shadow of Future affects a lot, especially in Prisoner’s Dilemma. If relation between actors continues for a long time and feedback is possible, defection can bring revenge afterward. To specify, considering some detailed factors will be needed: Long time horizons, regularity of stakes, reliability of information about the others’ actions, and quick feedback about changes in the others’ actions. Due to their distinct characteristics, international political economy and international security shows dissimilar behavior sometimes. Those factorsoffer good explanation about the difference shown in the case of 1914 and contemporary international debt negotiation. In terms of military security, long time horizons were almost impossible then since German executives were so enchanted by offensive advantage that precluding enemy countries from retaliation seems possible. Conversely, banks and debtor countries’ deals were easily expected to renewal and the sector places a premium on reputation shaped from former contributions. Therefore, far-sighted concept could be made by actors in games. For another factor, credibility of information about others’ behavior and quick feedback are also essential to maintain long time horizon cooperation. In this case, since political-economy realm may keep its own secrecy in pocket while military-security information is opened to public, cheating happens often in political-economic actions.

  When the number of actor increases, to identify defectors would be difficult, to focus retaliation on betrayer might be faced with an obstacle, and to have enough long-run incentives to chastise cannot be achieved. A sense of responsibility will be decreased hence the free rider. If adequate and mighty monitoring system and credible informational source are not equipped, sanctioning problems easily happens since searching for defectors becomes formidable, as we can see in evasive follow-up measures after 1983 U.S. embassy bombing in Beirut, Lebanon. Also, wrong targeted retaliation could provoke serious conflict like Anglo-Hanse trade wars. 

  In comparison to international political economy, international military-security issues are more vulnerable to sanctioning problem, because of the high expense of punishing, the difficulties of supervising, and the stringent demands for information that are inflicted when fruitful betrayal may curtail the shadow of future. The context of interaction also have an impact to enabling cooperation between actors as much as three game-theoric dimensions. In the second section of the article’s body, in this manner, issue linkage, domestic-international connections, and incompatibilities between games among different sets of actors work in multi-level games are discussed.

  Although the games are being played on different issues, each game can affect one another. That is the point issue-linkage starts. Linkage may be gainful to both actors when negotiating and can open the door to consent between seemingly uncompromisable issues. Egyptian’s political support to America and American economic aid to Egypt. In addition, like a log-rolling game, even if there are not common profits, deliberately made linkage can work successfully. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 shows the most appropriate instance. As Oye pointed out, two types of issue-linkage, “backscratching” and “blackmailing”, exist. Backscratcing brings about promise and blackmailing, in contrary, involves a threat. Albeit to make a distinction between backscratching and blackmailing is not a simple task, it is needed to be done because issue-linkages are not only beneficial also hazardous. (Henry Kissinger was criticized in this term, due to his diplomatic attitude toward Soviets.) Meanwhile, “contextual” issue-linkage shows that this form can often work to lessen trouble even without changing the inclination of the actors on the issues. International monetary reform in 1936 was possible thanks to fear of Nazi Germany, and Anglo-French naval arms race in 1852 eased thanks to aggressive Russia.

  Next, it is well-known that states’ international behaviors have been strongly influenced by domestic politics. Some issues are especially sensitive to domestic voice so that countries can not make rational decision as american government could not overcome unreasonable respect for General MacArthur. Besides, this mechanism can be exploited as a strategy, by meddling in other states’ domestic situation.

  Various games in international stage are sometimes compatible and sometimes incompatible. America after World War II was strong enough to dominate all other allies and urge them to cooperate, unlike nineteenth century’s Britain. In the case of 1914, constantly mentioned, there emerged a loyalty between military ally’s participants and this league became too strong to be changed into flexible linkage. It was unavoidable to get mixed up with incompatibility. (Of course, political-economy sector could resolve the problem then, thanks to its compatibility.)

  How to promote positive reciprocal attitude is undoubtedly an essential matter in cooperation. Axelrod designed an experiment and it showed that group of purely selfish performers even can cooperate if initial possibility is suggested. In this manner, states, innately self-centered, also can be motivated to perform reciprocity when payoff structures are those of Prisoner’s Dilemma. In other structures, such as Chicken Game and Stag Hunt, this explanation can not be perfectly applied, because TIT-for-TAT(equivalent retaliation)’s echo effect can solidify conflicts, as detente between America and Soviet failed. Also, reciprocity easily becomes deadlock despite actors’ common interests and rationality. Lastly, issue interdependent problem emerges and orders between agreements get chaotic. Still, it is the most probable solution to tide over deadlock, ironically. Lipson argued that reciprocity can be institutionalized in an N-person game, by splitting the multilateral game into bilateral game and by emphasizing reciprocity at a different level.

  With suggested diverse cases, importance of the way the actor perceives things is utterly self-evident. States are usually poor at estimating neighbor states’ intention or reaction. Those misperception between countries provoke conflicts worth recording like World War I and Cuban Crisis. To be a better perceiver and to prevent another catastrophe, advanced institutions and norms are needed.

  There might be some solutions like constructing hierarchy or establishing international regimes. Building an hierarchy has an example from inter-bank networks to give an impetus to rescheduling of Third World’s debts. Though international regimes can not be substitution for reciprocity, it can offer reinforcing and institutionalizing the reciprocal concepts. But these efforts are idealistic rather practical, so detecting the real factors of cooperation failure would be helpful.

  First, efforts to recompose the relationships may never progress favorably since most issues on the table are strongly arguable. Secondly, some agreements are established, but later, may turn out to contradict the actor itself. For the third, even successful adjustments are apt to spoil due to some loopholes. Lastly, sometimes there are irrelevant changes with the arrangements make them useless. It is not weird that skepticism about institution may arise under the circumstance of steadily failing cooperation between the actors. But everybody knows that the more states become cooperative the better results can be yielded, as we have seen from the former experience.

Summary of “Offense, Defense and the Security Dilemma” by Robert Jervis

2012학년도 2학기, 서강대학교 이근욱 교수님 "군사안보전략" 수업 1차 과제.

 Rogowski 논문 -

political_cleavages_and_changing_exposure_to_trade.pdf

링크:

 -금본위제 개괄 : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gold_standard

 -오즈의 마법사, 그리고 정치경제학적 해석 : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_interpretations_of_The_Wonderful_Wizard_of_Oz