The article “Offense, Defense and the Security Dilemma” written by Robert Jervis tacitly opens the possibility of cooperation under international anarchy as we can see in the real world. The author suggests that there are two important variables which decide an intensity of the security dilemma. One is whether defensive armaments and ideas can be differentiated from offensive ones, and the other is whether the defensive or the offensive strategy has the advantage. There are four cases combined by those two variables, and this explanation provides a clue to how the cooperation between nations under anarchy occurs and works.
As a typical example, First World War reminds us what happened when the super-powers judge that offense has the advantage. Although most of the combatant states were status-quo nations, they had no choice but to preempt because of a wrong belief about advantage of the offense which had gotten strength after Bismarck’s effective and quick-ended wars. Before the outbreak of Second World War, on the contrary, the security dilemma was so lessen that England and France were reluctant to show any aggressive motion and expected Germany to act as they behave. Since they had bitter experience from First World War, England and France thought defensive and gentle tactics were important and effective to prevent another war. We all know, of course, Adolf Hitler’s Germany was a revisionist state which we exclude in this article’s discussion, and Second World War happened so.
The article points out two crucial factors which decide beneficial strategy among the offense and the defense, one is technology and the other is geography. If there are enough natural barriers to make a state’s neighborhoods weak when they try to cross a border and attack, this state can concentrate on defensive strategy because those geographical obstacles serve as a buffer zone. Also geography is greatly influential in forming borders, that is why frequent wars are blocked sometimes because of natural obstruction, which is more efficient than unsubstantial treaty. If natural barriers have no will to help a state, it makes artificial ones such as DMZ or even railroad gauge filled with complication.
Technology is the other prime factor of the offense-defense balance, which means the kinds and capabilities of weapons can make difference in strategic tendency. Before the modern way of warfare emerged, it was undoubted that attackers scarcely raid against the defenses unless those aggressive men are highly superior. However, the situation has changed immensely since then in warfare as other sectors have, and it became hard to say which one of two strategy has the advantage. Especially since the nuclear power has appeared, any defense has become unimaginable and now only the deterrence works for nuclear power due to its incomparable killing power.
As the other crucial variable of the article, a capability of differentiation between offensive and defensive intention matters. There are three positive outcomes expected when a difference between offensive and defensive weapons appears to be obvious. (It is premised that the states have status-quo tendency in advance.) Status-quo powers may easily cooperate because they can be sure what their counterparts think basically, status-quo states will get alarmed before others scheme assaults and disarmament can function as an indisputable prohibition of offensive weapons. The author partly agrees to the criticism arguing that it is too obscure to draw a clear line between offensive and defensive arms. Some statesmen already tried to divide offensive from defensive weapons but there too many alterations in circumstances, therefore, those tries seem almost useless in the end. According to the author, the differentiation, nevertheless, still can function as a key to resolve the annoying by-product of anarchy, also called the security dilemma.
As results of the combinations of two variables, there are four possible cases when discussing a degree of risk in terms of security dilemma between status-quo powers. In the first world, the offense has the advantage and offensive and defensive postures can’t be distinguished. This is the worst and most unstable case since there is no exit to relax, which seems similar to Europe of early years of the twentieth century. Especially after the appearance of nuclear weapon, as we reflect the early stage of Cold War, it could have created higher crisis then.
The second world shows a better situation thanks to advantage of defense. Still, the security dilemma exists because offensive and defensive postures cannot be discriminated. It is the model actually describing the real world in most part of history because preemption is usually harder than defending and lack of confirmable judgment on surrounding states has existed for a long time. Even after the appearance of nuclear weapons, it is still vague if the weapon has any offensive object or only serves the defensive purpose.
The third world may not have the security dilemma but it has security problems because it is clear what neighbor states intend and there is also a hazard of becoming aggressive easily due to advantage of offense. Since the attraction of the offense is so strong under the anarchy, countries existing in this world are aware of the others constantly.
Lastly, the fourth world is the safest environment among these options. The differentiation between offensive and defensive strategy makes the security dilemma disappear, and the advantage of defensive tactic There is no exact match for this case, but if the European leaders at the time of first ten years of the twentieth century were more cautious and understood their circumstance exactly, it might have been this kind of doubly safe world.
Among the suggested models of world, except the first world, they shed a light on possibilities of cooperation. Anarchy is a undeniable and unavoidable phenomenon existing in the real world, and it might seem as the war of all against all sometimes. But if the two variables can be controlled properly, as much as possible, pursuit of stability beyond anarchy is not the just contradictory word.
